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T hree empirical regularities have been identified in the financial 
literature: bank credit markets operate with collateral, they operate with 
excess demand and they coexist with other forms of credit provision. In 
the particular case of less developed countries, the financial structure 
comprises the banking industry, the formal non-banking industry and 
the informal sector. This paper presents a theoretical model that explains 
all three regularities together. According to the model, wealth inequality 
in society is the essential factor that explains this dual-dual financial 
structure. The model predicts market segmentation: the wealthy and the 
banks constitute one market, the less wealthy and formal non-banking 
organizations constitute another and the poorest groups and small lenders 
constitute the informal sector; moreover, credit is more expensive in 
the latter sectors. As long as wealth inequality remains unchanged, this 
financial structure will prevail. The public policy implications of the model 
are also presented. 
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Three empirical regularities in the workings of bank 
credit markets have been identified by the literature: 
(1) bank credit markets operate with collateral (Berger 
and Udell, 1995); (2) bank credit markets operate with 
demand rationing (Berger and Udell, 1992; Steijvers 
and Voordeckers, 2009); and (3) bank credit markets 
coexist with non-bank forms of credit provision, which 
operate with higher interest rates. The third regularity 
is particularly significant in less developed countries 
(Campion, Kiran-Ekka and Wenner, 2010; Banerjee, 
2003). A review of the literature failed to identify any 
empirical studies testing theoretical models of bank 
credit markets. 
These three facts can be interpreted as the equilibrium 
conditions under which the banking industry operates. 
Any particular values that equilibrium prices and 
quantities may take in the market will satisfy those 
conditions. Consequently, the simplest way to refute any 
theoretical model of a bank credit market is to show that 
its predictions about the observable equilibrium conditions 
are inconsistent with these regularities. This paper will 
present a theoretical model that is able to predict all three 
regularities together. Of course, a complete refutation 
also requires a set of empirical predictions about the 
relations between endogenous and exogenous variables 
in the theoretical model, which can then be compared 
statistically against empirical data. That task lies beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Standard economics has sought to explain facts (1) 
and (2) by the theory of asymmetric information. The 
model developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is the 
classic presentation of the theory. According to this model, 
credit markets operate with rationing. The interest rate 
does not clear the market because loan quality, insofar 
as it affects bank profits, is not independent of this rate. 
The model does not necessarily predict equilibrium with 
excess demand, however; rationing could also take the 
form of excess supply. In other words, excess demand 
plays no role in the functioning of bank credit markets; 
i.e., it is not a necessity. Fact (2) implies the opposite. 
At the same time, different views on the nature of 
credit market equilibrium coexist within the standard 
literature. While the credit market is treated as Walrasian 
in most macro-models (Barro, 1997; Krugman and Wells, 
2006), it is treated as non-Walrasian by the Stiglitz-Weiss 
model and its followers. In his Nobel Lecture, Stiglitz 
(2002) even argued that equilibrium in the credit market 
may not exist.
What type of market is the bank credit market? 
This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of bank 
credit markets that will seek to answer this theoretical 
question. The assumptions of the model depart from the 
models utilized in standard economics in several ways 
in order to to explain the determination of prices and 
quantities as observed in bank credit markets. Without 
a sound theoretical basis, public policies run the risk 
of failure. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents a review of the literature on the empirical testing 
of partial equilibrium models of bank credit markets, 
which shows that this topic has been understudied. The 
nature of the bank credit market is presented in section 
III. Construction of the proposed partial equilibrium 
model starts in section IV, where a competitive model 
of bank credit is presented. The empirical predictions of 
the model are then developed. A non-competitive model 
may seem more appropriate for studying the banking 
industry, but we can invoke the theorem of equivalence: 
although competitive, monopoly and oligopoly models 
have different structural equations, under certain conditions 
they will qualitatively generate the same reduced form 
equations (same empirical predictions). The competitive 
model is the simplest; hence, bank credit markets can 
fruitfully be studied using a competitive market model. 
A dual model of credit markets that connects the banking 
and formal non-banking industries is presented in section 
V. Section VI introduces the informal credit sector and 
analyses its role in the functioning of the whole credit 
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In order to review the state of scientific knowledge on 
the bank credit market, an epistemological justification 
is needed. The Popperian epistemology of falsification 
will be the criterion utilized in this study. In the case 
of economics, this epistemology states that a good 
economic theory must produce a model from which 
empirically falsifiable propositions are derived; these 
empirical predictions should then be compared against 
empirical data. If predictions and data do not coincide, 
the model is refuted by reality; if all models of the theory 
are refuted, the theory is refuted; otherwise, the theory 
may be accepted provisionally, at the present stage of 
the investigation, until new data appear. 
Table 1 presents the results of the literature 
review. The categories utilized refer to the Popperian 
methodology. The set of primary assumptions of each 
economic theory (general equilibrium theory) will be 
called alpha propositions. An economic theory is a family 
of models; therefore, the assumptions of a particular 
model about the functioning of the bank credit market 
will be called alpha prime. From this model, empirical 
predictions—called beta propositions—are derived about 
the relationships between the endogenous variables 
(price and quantity) and the exogenous variables, 
which are refutable or falsifiable. Thus, there are two 
types of refutable empirical predictions of the model: 
(a) observable equilibrium conditions, which are valid 
for every value that market prices and quantities may 
take, and (b) beta propositions. 
Studies that have no epistemological justification 
can be characterized as having an empirical hypothesis 








Fixed price Asymmetric information
α’





Inderst and Mueller (2007)
Tressel (2003)
Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999)
Besanko and Thakor (1987)
Chan and Kanatas (1985)
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
Fried and Howitt (1980)
β’
β’ ≈ b     
H ≈ b   
 Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, (2005)
Shleifer (2005)
Morduch (1999)
Berger and Udell (1995)
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
Berger and Udell (1992)
Berger and others (2004)
Source: selected references from the literature, reviewed using jstor and EconLit databases for the 1980-2008 period.
Notes: jstor is a multi-disciplinary digital archive of academic journals, which provides the full text of articles up to three to five years 
before the most recent issue (see [online] www.consorciomadrono.es/info/web/consorcio_madrono/recursos_electronicos/jstor.php). EconLit 
is an exhaustive bibliography of world economic literature, indexed with selected abstracts, produced by the American Economic Association. 
It covers over 400 journals as well as papers from edited volumes.
Symbols: α: primary assumptions of each economic theory; α’: models of the theories; β’: empirical predictions about relationships between 
endogenous and exogenous variables, logically derived from the models; β’ ≈ b: statistical testing of the theoretical predictions; H ≈ b: 
statistical testing of hypotheses without theory.
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H. This hypothesis can be tested statistically. If it 
passes the test, it will corroborate the hypothesis and 
correlations, but there will not be causality. Causality 
—the relationship between endogenous and exogenous 
variables— can only be derived from a theoretical 
model. Causality takes the form of a beta proposition, 
as indicated in table 1.
Relevant and representative bibliographical 
references are shown in table 1. This indicates the 
existence of a vast literature on asymmetric information 
models, which predict that the bank credit market 
operates with collateral and rationing. It also indicates the 
existence of a large literature applying statistical testing 
to hypotheses which lack a theoretical underpinning, the 
so-called “empirical approach”. The conclusion is clear: 
the cells corresponding to studies where theories have 
been subject to the falsification process are empty (the 
third row). Not even the set of beta propositions has been 
developed (the second row). This paper proposes to help 
fill the gap by presenting a set of falsifiable empirical 
predictions logically derived from the particular model 
developed here. 
III
The nature of the credit market
What type of market is the bank credit market? Could 
excess demand play any role in the functioning of credit 
markets? The type of transaction that takes place in a 
credit market involves the exchange of a sum of money 
now for the promise to repay later at a given interest rate. 
This is the nature of the credit market. Hence, this market 
raises the principal-agent problem. Could it operate as 
a Walrasian market? If individuals could always obtain 
the credit they desired at the prevailing market interest 
rate, they would not have economic incentives to repay 
the loan. If individuals could get credit irrespective 
of the effort they made to repay the loan and of their 
repayment history, why should they bother to repay the 
loan or avoid risky projects? Borrowers would not incur 
any cost if they defaulted. In sum, the credit market 
cannot operate as a Walrasian market.
What devices might banks use to discipline 
borrowers? A possible one would be to set the interest 
rate below the Walrasian price. Excess demand would 
thus be generated. The cost of default would now be 
the exclusion of bad borrowers from the credit market. 
Thus, the credit market could operate on a non-Walrasian 
basis, with excess demand. 
How could this market result be attained? Assume 
that banks use collateral on loans as a device to discipline 
borrowers. The cost of default is now the loss of the 
collateral. Assume that the distribution of wealth in 
society is highly unequal. In addition, assume a financial 
technology that has economies of scale, so that large 
credits are more profitable for banks; then banks will have 
an incentive to do business with the wealthy segment of 
the market only. Total demand is now separated into two: 
those served by banks (the wealthy) and those excluded 
(the poor), who are served by the non-banking market, 
in which another financial technology will be used.
This is the model that will be formally developed in 
what follows. It will be shown that this model predicts 
the three empirical regularities stated above. Whether the 
empirical predictions of the model (relationships between 
endogenous and exogenous variables of the model) are 
refuted by data will require statistical testing. 
The credit market is clearly influenced by and itself 
influences the rest of the economy. In order to reduce the 
second effect and justify the use of partial equilibrium 
analysis, this study will divide the bank credit market into 
several particular markets, which can then be analysed 
separately. More specifically, the partial equilibrium 
model is intended to explain the functioning of markets 
for short-term credit (for working capital) and long-run 
credit (for investment), in which the demand comes 
from firms alone. For simplicity, credit demand from 
households will not be part of this study. 
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The particular model of the standard theory of credit 
markets that will be presented here seeks to explain the 
behaviour of prices and quantities in the banking industry. 
The basic assumptions of the model are the following: 
— agents operate in a capitalist society in which the 
initial individual endowment of wealth, mainly 
physical capital, is significantly unequal; 
— market lending transactions take place in a context of 
uncertainty, asymmetric information and significant 
transaction costs; 
— technology in the banking industry is such that 
there are major economies of scale in transaction 
costs when loans are large; 
— collateral is the device banks use to generate a 
disincentive for borrowers to default. 
How does the banking industry operate in such a 
context? This is the question that the model will seek 
to answer.
The banking industry is composed of two markets, 
the credit market and the deposit market. Banks are the 
financial intermediaries. Prices and quantities in the 
banking industry will depend upon the market structure 
or degree of market power of buyers and sellers. The 
model will assume that the banking industry operates 
with a market structure of perfect competition, for the 
reasons given in the Introduction. 
1. The behaviour of banks
The model assumes that banks set an amount of collateral 
sufficient to cover the loan and the interest to be repaid; 
that is, loans are fully covered by the collateral. It 
also assumes that the enforcement of loan contracts 
is costless; consequently, the problems of asymmetric 
information are reduced significantly. The implication of 
these assumptions is that all potential borrowers become 
homogeneous in terms of risk. Therefore, banks can 
seek to maximize profits in the manner that is common 
in standard demand-supply analysis.
In a situation of perfect competition, banks are 
price takers in both the credit market and the deposit 
market. They can supply the quantity of credit they desire 
at the prevailing market lending interest rate; they can 
also acquire the quantity of deposits they desire at the 
prevailing market deposit interest rate. In determining 
the quantities they are willing to transact, banks will be 
guided by the desire to maximize profits. 
The model then assumes the following behaviour 
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The first equation of system (1) is the bank’s profit 
equation, where P stands for nominal profits, r for the 
nominal lending interest rate, Sr for the nominal quantity 
of credit, r~  for the nominal deposit interest rate, D
~
  r for 
the nominal quantity of deposits, C for the total variable 
cost of intermediation and FC for the total fixed costs of 
the bank. The second equation is just the variable cost 
function. The third equation shows the restriction that the 
bank’s loanable fund is net of the reserve requirement, 
whose rate e is established by the monetary authority. 
This last constraint indicates that banks set threshold 
values for the size of individual loanable funds by borrower 
(called s), which cannot be smaller than s*. This is due 
to the nature of the intermediation cost faced by banks. 
The intermediation cost includes transaction costs and 
the cost of intermediation proper. The model assumes 
that the transaction cost per borrower is constant; i.e., 
it is independent of loan size. Therefore, the unit cost 
per dollar of lending declines with loan size up to size 
s* and then becomes constant. The bank thus has no 
incentive to lend money to borrowers seeking loans 
smaller than s*. 
In the short run, banks must determine the quantity 
of lending that maximizes profits. From the structural 
equations shown in system (1), the equilibrium condition 
can then be derived by differentiating the profit equation 
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A competitive model of the bank credit market 
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The individual bank will seek to maximize profits, 
which implies equalizing the market lending interest 
rate with the marginal cost of providing credit (MC). 
The latter is equal to the net marginal cost of acquiring 
the necessary bank deposits plus the marginal cost of 
intermediation. 
The equilibrium condition in (2) is clearly stable; 
consequently, the static comparative method can be 
applied to this equilibrium condition to derive empirical 
predictions for the behaviour of the representative bank. 
The endogenous variables include the quantities of loans 
and deposits. The exogenous variables include lending 
and deposit interest rates and the reserve requirement 
ratio. The capital stock of the bank is also exogenously 
given, but changes in it will be ignored in this short-
run model.
The effects of changes in the exogenous variables 
upon the endogenous variables can easily be derived 
from equation (2). The reduced form equations are then 
obtained as follows: 
 ˜S F r r e( ,  ,  ),  0,  0,  0rk k k k k1 2 3= > < <F F F  (3a)













The equilibrium quantity of credit supplied by 
representative bank k depends upon the exogenous 
variables of the model, as shown in equation (3a). An 
increase in the lending interest rate has the effect of 
increasing the quantity of credit supplied because it 
increases marginal revenue; an increase in the deposit 
interest rate or in the reserve requirement ratio has the 
effect of reducing the quantity of credit supplied because 
the marginal cost increases. 
The bank will determine the quantity of credit 
supplied on the basis of the values of the exogenous 
variables. The required quantity of deposits will then also 
be determined, as a derived demand for bank deposits. 
This is shown in equation (4a).
The aggregate behaviour of banks will be obtained 
by simple addition of the equations of the individual 
banks, as shown in system (3a)-(4a), across all banks 
in the industry. Thus, equation (3) represents the market 
supply function of bank credit and equation (4) the market 
derived demand function for bank deposits. 
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2. The behaviour of households and the supply 
of bank deposits
In a market economy that includes banks, the quantity 
of money will be equal to currency in circulation plus 
demand deposits. Both can be used as a means of payment. 
Households must choose not only the stock of money 
they want to hold, but also its allocation between bank 
deposits and cash balances. 
A model of household behaviour will now be 
presented. There is a demand for money from households 
to cope with the transaction and precautionary needs 
that arise in a market economy. Holding cash has an 
opportunity cost, which is given by the deposit interest 
rate paid by banks. Households will therefore decide 
on a portfolio of cash and bank deposits to meet their 
demand for money. 
The model will assume that households choose their 
portfolios on the basis of the mean return and risk of 
each asset, as suggested by the standard mean-variance 
theory. Cash may be considered an asset with no return 
and no risk, whereas bank deposits may be considered 
an asset with a positive mean return and risk. The risk 
includes the instability of individual banks and that of 
the banking system as a whole. The model also assumes 
the existence of a State regulatory policy involving State 
deposit insurance up to a certain deposit amount and the 
supervision of bank operations, such that the State is the 
lender of last resort. As far as households are concerned, 
all banks are thus homogeneous in terms of the risk of 
deposits not being returned (there are no high-risk banks 
and low-risk banks). Bank deposits entail risks due to 
the variability of interest rates, however. 
An individual household’s portfolio will therefore 
depend on the deposit interest rate and the real income 
of the household. The higher the interest rate paid 
by banks, the larger the quantity of money deposited 
in them; the higher the household’s real income, the 
larger the quantities of both assets in its portfolio. If 
money endowment changes exogenously, households 
will revise their portfolios, and the effects on both cash 
and bank deposits will also be positive. Hence, for the 
representative household h it follows that:
 ˜ ˜S G r Y,  ,  0,  0rh
h h h
1 2)(= > >G G  (5a)
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The market supply function of bank deposits will 
be obtained by aggregating the individual household 
functions. Then:
 ˜ ˜h Srh  ≡ Sr = G (r, Y, Sm), G1 > 0, G2 > 0, G3 > 0 ∑ ˜  (5)
The exogenous variables in function (5) include the 
deposit interest rate (r˜) and households’ income level 
(Y). In the aggregation of micro behaviour to market 
behaviour, one new exogenous variable will appear. 
This is the central bank’s money supply (Sm), which 
is determined by the monetary authority and which in 
equilibrium must be equal to the currency willingly held 
by households and by banks as required reserves. The 
larger the money supply, the higher the excess demand 
for money in the hands of households and the greater 
bank deposits will be. 
3. The behaviour of production firms and the 
demand for bank credit
The demand for bank credit will come from production 
firms alone (lending to households will be ignored). Two 
types of credit demand will be considered: to finance 
working capital in the short run and to finance capital 
accumulation in the long run.
Firms are endowed with quantities of fixed capital 
(K). Assume that all firms produce a single good, called 
good B, which has a market price Pb. Also assume that 
only one set of labour skills is utilized in the production 
of good B in quantity Dh at the nominal market wage 
rate Ph.
Another factor of production will be introduced 
now: circulating or working capital. This production 
input is a financial fund, which firms take in the form 
of credit from banks and which is utilized in a fixed 
proportion of total output. Let Drj = vjPbQbj, where 
Dr is the nominal quantity of credit demanded and v is 
the technical coefficient of working capital per unit of 
output value. 
Firms seek to maximize profits. The behaviour of 
the representative firm, which is now identified as firm 
t, can be summarized as follows:
 
Max P P Q P D rD
s.t Q g D K D
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 (6)
The first equation of system (6) shows the individual 
firm’s nominal profit (P), which is equal to the net value 
of output (net of physical capital replacement and net of 
working capital replacement or loan repayment) minus 
labour costs and minus the cost of the short-term loan. 
The constraint is given by the limitational production 
function, represented as a system of equations, which 
assumes that fixed capital and labour are substitutes 
for each other (function g) but neither is a substitute 
for working capital.
In the short run, firms must decide on the quantity of 
employment that maximizes profits. From the structural 
equations of system (6), the equilibrium condition can be 
derived by differentiating the first equation with respect 
to Dh. This condition is:
 P g D K rv P,  1b
t
ht h1 )( − =t t[ ]  (7)
In order to maximize profits, the individual firm 
must hire labour until the net value of the marginal 
productivity of labour, net of the cost of working capital 
per unit of output that is required to realize this output, 
is equal to the nominal market wage rate Ph.
The equilibrium condition in (7) is clearly stable; 
therefore, comparative statics may be applied to derive 
the behaviour of the individual firm. The endogenous 
variables of the model include Dh, Qb and Dr , while 
the exogenous variables include Pb, K, r and Ph (the 
technological coefficient v is assumed to be invariant in 
the short run). The reduced form equation is obtained 
from equation (7). The labour demand function can be 
written as:
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where equilibrium prices and quantities are marked with 
a superscript zero. The derived demand for short-run 
credit can then be written as:
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The quantity of bank credit demanded by firm j 
depends negatively upon the lending interest rate and 
upon the firm’s other exogenous variables, as shown in 
equation (9). 
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The quantity of bank credit demanded in the market 
will be arrived at by aggregating individual equilibrium 
quantities across all firms. Then, for a given total of n 
firms in the bank credit market and a given distribution of 
capital endowments between firms such that m firms have 
capital equal to or higher than the threshold value s*,
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Equation (10) shows the aggregation of the 
quantity of bank credit demanded by production firms. 
But the aggregation includes only firms endowed with 
a large amount of capital, equal to or greater than the 
threshold loan size (s*) that banks require if firms are 
to be eligible for credit, as shown in system (1). The 
aggregate quantity of bank credit demanded Dr* may 
then be called the effective aggregate demand for bank 
credit. Let Dr represent the total demand for credit; then 
Dr > Dr*. Hence, small firms to the number of (n – m) 
will be excluded from the bank credit market. 
In the process of aggregation, another exogenous 
variable appears in the credit demand function J: the 
degree of concentration of total physical capital among 
firms, the variable δ. The effect of this variable is positive. 
If the given total stock of capital in the economy is more 
concentrated in the highest percentiles, the demand for 
credit will be higher. The reason is simple: those high 
percentiles of the distribution, which are already eligible 
for bank credit, will now account for a larger share of 
the capital stock. The quantity of capital that is available 
as collateral will then be a larger proportion of the total 
capital stock. In the extreme case where the whole capital 
stock of the economy was in the hands of one firm, the 
proportion of total capital available as collateral and 
eligible for bank credit would be 100%. In the contrary 
extreme case where the capital stock of the economy 
was divided among many firms that were too small to be 
eligible for credit, there would be no effective demand 
for credit and no bank credit market. 
In the long run, production firms need financing for 
their investment projects. Each project has an expected 
rate of return. Firms will take out loans to finance a 
project if and only if the interest rate is equal to or less 
than the expected rate of return. At lower market interest 
rates, the quantity of projects seeking financing will be 
greater and the long-run quantity of bank credit demanded 
will be higher. The reason is very simple: there will be 
more projects with low returns than with high returns; 
thus, if the interest rate were lower, projects that were 
not profitable before would now become so, while those 
that were profitable before would continue to be so. 
The behaviour of production firms seeking investment 
financing generates a downward-sloping demand curve. 
This is similar to the demand curve for short-run working 
capital. The prices, however, will be different, i.e., there 
will be a short-run interest rate and a long-run interest rate 
in the bank credit market. They constitute two separate 
bank credit markets, but the same demand function (10) 
can be utilized to represent either case. 
4. Market equilibrium conditions
Market equilibrium conditions can be written as equality 
between quantities supplied and demanded in each 
market. Thus:
 Credit market Sr r r
*D D= <  (11)
 =Deposit market D Sr r˜ ˜  (12)
Equation (11) says that bank credit market 
equilibrium requires equality between the quantity of 
credit supplied (by banks) and the effective quantity 
of credit demanded (from eligible production firms, 
selected by banks). It is a Walrasian market in the sense 
that there is no excess demand in terms of the effective 
demand category (Dr*), but it is non-Walrasian in the 
sense that it operates with excess demand in terms of 
the total demand category (Dr). According to the first 
concept, effective demand and supply are not independent, 
as effective demand is influenced by bank behaviour. 
If banks changed the threshold values for eligibility, 
effective demand would change even though total demand 
remained constant. The bank credit market may thus be 
called a quasi-Walrasian market. 
The Stiglitz-Weiss model assumes a relationship 
between expected returns to the bank and the lending 
interest rate, in the form of an inverted U. Thus, an 
optimal interest rate exists and banks choose this as 
the market price, which is independent of quantities, 
and in this way the credit market can operate with 
either excess demand or excess supply. Collateral is 
then introduced in a manner that does not fully protect 
the loan and interest, so that asymmetric information 
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continues to be the main feature of the model. Collateral 
may, under certain conditions, reduce the expected rate 
of return for banks. The same argument is also found 
in Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001). In the present 
paper, the model assumes full collateral, implying that 
the effective demand curve is one of the essential market 
relationships; hence, prices and quantities are determined 
simultaneously in the credit market.
Equation (12) shows the equilibrium condition of the 
bank deposit market. The quantity of deposits supplied 
(by households) must be equal to the quantity of deposits 
demanded (from banks). This is a Walrasian market.
The banking industry model thus has four structural 
equations: (3), (4), (5) and (10). They should be sufficient 
to solve for the four endogenous variables, two prices 
and two quantities: r, r˜, Q = Sr = Dr and Q˜ = Sr = Dr˜ ˜ . 
The equilibrium conditions shown in system (11)-(12) 
can then be rewritten as:









S G(r, S ,  ) 1
1m r (14)
The first condition shows the transaction between 
banks and firms, the second the transaction between 
banks and households; in each case, the quantity supplied 
must be equal to the quantity demanded. The aggregate 
behaviour of production firms is represented by function 
J and that of households by function G. 
The competitive market equilibrium is represented 
in figure 1. The structural equations are represented 
by the supply and demand curves in the credit and 
deposit markets. The parameters of each credit curve 
are fixed. Then the equilibrium condition determines the 
equilibrium values of the lending interest rate and the 
quantity of credit; the latter determines the equilibrium 
quantity of bank deposits, which will be forthcoming 
at a particular value for the deposit interest rate, which 
should be equal to the initial value for equilibrium to 
be attained in both markets. The two supply-demand 
curves are interdependent; hence, the equilibrium values 
of prices and quantities in the credit and deposit markets 
are determined simultaneously. 
It will be most convenient for what follows to solve 
the system (11)-(12) using the corresponding inverse 
demand and supply functions, which are called demand 
and supply curves. Demand and supply functions are 
monotonic by assumption. This assumption is sufficient 
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supply-demand model: equilibrium 
conditions in bank credit and bank deposit 
markets 
Source: Prepared by the author.
Symbols: S: bank credit supply curve; D: effective bank credit 
demand curve; S˜: effective bank deposit supply curve; D˜: derived 
demand for bank deposits; r: nominal lending interest rate; r˜ : 
nominal deposit interest rate.
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Equation (17a) can now be inserted into the credit 
supply curve, equation (15):
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Finally, the credit market equilibrium condition 
shown in (13) above now becomes:
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Equation (19) constitutes the core of the system. 
This single equation will determine the equilibrium value 
Q0, given the values of the exogenous variables of the 
entire system, and will thus generate the first reduced 
form equation of the model. The other three endogenous 
variables are solved by substitution, i.e., by substituting 
Q with the reduced form equation of Q0 in structural 
equations (15a), (17a) and (18).
5. Empirical predictions of the competitive model
The equilibrium condition of the core of the system, 
represented in equation (19), is clearly stable: the 
consolidated supply curve has a positive slope (H’1 > 0) 
and the demand curve has a negative slope (J’1 < 0). The 
comparative statics method can therefore be applied to the 
equilibrium condition to derive the empirical predictions 
of the model. The variables of the model are:
Endogenous r, r˜, Q, Q˜
Exogenous Y, Sm, e, Pb, Ph, K, δ 
The causality relationships (relationships between 
endogenous and exogenous variables in the reduced 
form equations) may be obtained in two different ways. 
The two structural equations (15a) and (16) may be 
utilized to find the partial derivatives with respect to 
each of the exogenous variables and solve for the sign 
of the partial derivatives from the corresponding matrix. 
Alternatively, the partial derivatives may be found first 
in equation (19), the core equation of the system, and 
then the algorithm follows in structural equations (15a), 
(17a) and (18), incorporating the results obtained into 
the core equation in each case. 
However, the derivation of the causality relationships 
can be made graphically because the system is very simple 
and formal derivation is unnecessary. The graphical 
representation of the comparative statics for the credit 
market as the core of the system is shown in figure 2. 
The effects of increases in each exogenous variable 
upon the equilibrium price and quantity through shifts 
in the supply curve are shown in panel (a), while those 
arising through shifts in the demand curve are shown in 
panel (b). The corresponding effect upon the equilibrium 
price and quantity in the deposit market is determined 
only through substitution using structural equations 
(17a) and (18). 
The set of empirical predictions of the model are 
summarized in matrix form in table 2. These predictions 
can then be subjected to the process of empirical refutation. 
Failure in one cell is sufficient to refute the model; if 
no cell fails, then there is no reason to reject the model 
and it may be accepted at this stage of the research. It 
can be shown that under certain standard assumptions, 
other market structures (monopoly and oligopoly) will 
generate the same matrix. 
Statistical testing of the empirical predictions 
presented in table 2 is beyond the scope of this study. The 
literature review summarized in table 1 above presented 
six empirical studies that carried out hypothesis testing. 
Unfortunately, none of these studies sought to establish 
statistical relationships for the variables included in the 
model presented here; if they did, their results could 
TABLE 2 
Matrix of empirical predictions logically 
derived from the competitive model
Endogenous variables
Exogenous variables
Y Sm e Pb Ph K δ
r − − + + − + ?
r˜ ? ? ? + − + ?
Q + + − + − + +
Q˜ + + ? + − +  +
Source: Prepared by the author.
Symbols: r: interest rate on bank loans; r˜: interest rate on bank 
deposits; Q: quantity of bank credit; Q˜: quantity of bank deposits; 
Y: national income; Sm: money supply; e: reserve requirement rate; 
Pb: price level; Ph: nominal wage rate; K: stock of physical capital; 
δ: degree of wealth concentration.
47
InCoME InEquALIty AnD CREDIt MARkEts  •  ADoLfo fIguERoA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 1
have been used as first indicators of consistency or 
refutation of some of the signs shown in table 2. Those 
studies were interested in other variables, such as bank 
concentration, credit rationing, the direct impacts of 
micro-credit, macro-credit as a ratio to gross domestic 
product (gdp), the role of the legal system and credit in 
macroeconomic cycles. Empirical research is therefore 
expected to be encouraged by the results presented 
in table 2, which constitute a set of hypotheses with 
theoretical backing. 
FIGURE 2 
Graphic representation of comparative statics from the competitive model
Source: Prepared by the author.
Notes: Graph (a): an increase in exogenous variable Y, Sm or δ shifts the consolidated bank credit supply curve outward, but an increase 
in e shifts the curve inward. Graph (b): an increase in exogenous variable Pb, K or δ shifts the bank credit demand curve outward, but an 
increase in Ph shifts the curve inward.















A dual model 
The banking industry model will now be extended to 
explain why the banking industry and formal non-banking 
financial organizations coexist. This new model will be 
called the dual model. 
Non-banking organizations are small in size and are 
usually called micro-financial organizations, examples 
being cooperatives, credit unions and small State and 
private-sector financial organizations. They are also 
State-regulated. 
Consider that prices and quantities in the banking 
industry have already been determined. The equilibrium 
in the bank credit market is with excess demand. Those 
excluded from the bank credit market are the less wealthy, 
and they will seek loans in the non-banking credit 
market; therefore, the demand curve for non-banking 
organizations will also be determined. Non-banking 
organizations are also financial intermediaries and thus 
need to have deposits to make their loans. They will use 
several incentives. One is to establish a requirement 
for deposits to be made as a condition of eligibility for 
loans, so potential borrowers of small loans will have 
an incentive to deposit their funds in the non-banking 
organization instead of in the banking industry (the 
case of a cooperative is a clear example); another is to 
pay an interest rate higher than banks pay. The deposit 
supply curve in the non-banking organization will thus 
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be determined. This is a rising curve, and it starts at the 
value given by the deposit interest rate prevailing in the 
banking industry, because this is the opportunity cost 
of those funds. 
How are prices and quantities determined in the 
non-banking industry? Financial intermediaries in the 
non-banking financial market are also profit maximizers. 
To generate and maximize profits while supplying small 
individual loans, they must use financial intermediation 
technologies different to those of the banking industry; 
in particular, transaction costs will be smaller due to 
more personal relations with borrowers. The competitive 
equilibrium in the non-banking industry will be determined 
much as in the banking industry, by the interaction of 
supply and demand. 
The equilibrium situation of the dual financial 
market is illustrated in figure 3. Prices and quantities 
are first determined in the banking industry (first panel), 
which implies exclusion of potential borrowers, who 
seek credit in the non-banking industry and determine 
the demand curve Dn, shown in the second panel. 
The supply curve of deposits in the non-banking 
market is represented by the rising supply curve Sn, 
which starts at the bank deposit interest rate. The 
equilibrium quantity and price in the credit market 
are determined by the intersection of the demand and 
supply curves at point B. Given the reserve requirement 
rate, the equilibrium quantity and price in the deposit 
market that are consistent with point B are given 
at point B’. In the non-banking sector, prices and 
quantities in the credit and deposit markets are thus 
determined simultaneously. 
Several predictions of this dual model of financial 
markets can now be derived. First, the banking and non-
banking industries operate as separate but connected 
markets. The overall equilibrium is sequentially 
determined: equilibrium in the non-banking industry is 
determined once the equilibrium in the banking industry 
is known; in particular, changes in the deposit interest 
rate in the banking industry will change the equilibrium 
values of price and quantity in the non-banking industry. 
Second, the duality of the market is associated with 
wealth distribution: the wealthy and the banks constitute 
one financial market, whereas the poor and the non-
banks constitute the other. Third, in equilibrium, both 
prices (credit and deposit interest rates) are higher in 
the non-banking industry than in the banking industry. 
These predictions are consistent with the regularity (3) 
described in the Introduction. 
Fresh empirical evidence for Peru is shown in 
table 3. Average prices and average quantities in the 
banking system over the period 2003-2008 indicate 
what the model predicts: (a) in the credit market, banks 
supply credits of larger average size than non-banks and 
charge lower interest rates; (b) in the deposit market, 
banks attract deposits of larger average size than non-
banks and pay lower interest rates. The model is thus 
able to explain fact (3). 
FIGURE 3
sequential general equilibrium in dual financial markets
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VI
A dual-dual model
sector includes individuals (including “loan sharks” as 
well as friends and relatives) and some organizations, 
such as non-governmental organizations (ngos). 
One of the characteristics of the informal credit sector 
is that it is not State-regulated. Contracts are thus informal. 
Another is that the suppliers of funds are not financial 
intermediaries, as they mostly use their own funds. The 
last characteristic is that credit provision takes the form 
of both market and non-market transactions. The latter 
consist of exchanges between friends and relatives and are 
TABLE 3
Peru: prices and quantities in credit and deposit markets, 2003-2008
(Nominal annual interest rates, monetary values in nominal new soles)
Credit market Banksc Non-banksc














































Source: author’s calculations. The primary source is data published by the Superintendency of Banks and Insurance (sbs), the State banking 
regulator of Peru, on its website (www.sbs.gob.pe), last accessed on 16 June 2010. Regarding calculation methods: 
(i) Average quantities of credit per bank or cooperative (caja) (q) refer to lending to firms; original data refer to debt stock at the end of 
the year; data on credit distribution by term/currency are unavailable. 
(ii) The original interest rate (r) data are daily; for calculations, the rates of the last day of the month were utilized, and then the averages 
for the five years from May 2003 to April 2008 were calculated. 
(iii) Large loans are those higher than US$ 20,000 up to 2003 and US$ 30,000 thereafter, as identified by the sbs.
Notes:
a Long- (short-)term: average rates for credits or deposits longer (shorter) than 360 days in local currency (nc: Peruvian new soles) or 
foreign currency (fc: dollars). 
b Average per year and per borrower or depositor. 
c The banking system includes 20 banks, and the non-banking system is represented by two types of microfinance organizations: cajas 
municipales (12) and cajas rurales (10). 
d Interest rates are lower in the non-banking sector than in the banking sector in all cases, as indicated by the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric 
test at a 5% significance level. 
e This category represents a small fraction of the total credit supply within the group (vertical or horizontal).
Will there be excess demand for credit once the non-
banking market has been introduced? The existence of 
the so-called informal credit sector in less developed 
countries indicates that the answer is yes. The dual credit 
market is State-regulated and excludes a particular group 
of potential borrowers: those with very few or no assets, 
the poorest groups in society. Consider particularly the 
group of self-employed workers in urban or rural areas 
who need small loans and for short periods for their 
small businesses or small farms. On the supply side, this 
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based on rules of reciprocity, social control mechanisms, 
social networks and family ties. The use of credit as part 
of multiple exchanges of goods is also common (credit 
provided to farmers by merchants, for example) and 
can be seen as a type of interlocking transactions that 
are hard to define as pure market transactions. For these 
reasons, it is more appropriate to call it the informal 
credit sector, rather than market. The construction of 
theoretical models for this very heterogeneous sector 
is something that needs to be done. After reviewing a 
large set of empirical surveys and studies on informal 
credit, Banerjee (2003) underscored “the significance 
of developing a proper theory” (p.10). 
Empirical regularities are hard to establish for 
informal credit. These transactions are not usually 
registered. However, some studies have aggregated 
empirical surveys and case studies in particular regions 
to produce some empirical regularities. Hence, Banerjee 
(2003) finds that credit exchange does indeed take the 
form of market and non-market exchange. For Latin 
America, a study concludes that “a plethora of reports 
document that microfinance institutions charge far less 
than informal money lenders” and reports rates of 22% 
a year versus 120% (cited in Campion, Rashmi-Kiran 
and Wenner, 2010). These facts are consistent with the 
predictions of the dual-dual model.
VII
Conclusions
A new model of the standard theory of bank credit 
markets has been developed in this paper. The model 
predicts that the equilibrium conditions under which the 
banking industry operates include: the use of collateral, 
equilibrium with excess demand and coexistence with a 
non-banking financial sector. The financial structure is 
thus composed of the banking industry, the formal non-
banking industry and the informal sector. The equilibrium 
values of prices and quantities in the banking industry 
determine the prices and quantities of the formal non-
banking industry, which in turn determine prices and 
quantities in the informal sector. 
According to the model, wealth inequality in society 
is the essential factor explaining this dual-dual financial 
structure. The model then predicts market segmentation: 
the wealthy and the banks constitute one market, the 
less wealthy and formal non-banking organizations 
constitute another and the poorest groups and small 
lenders constitute the informal sector; prices are higher 
in the two latter sectors. 
The bank credit market is quasi-Walrasian in its 
operation in the sense that the market clears, but for 
effective demand (from eligible borrowers, as determined 
by banks) rather than total demand. Those excluded 
from this market will seek credit in the regulated non-
bank credit market. This second market is also quasi-
Walrasian because it clears, but for effective demand (from 
eligible borrowers as determined by the non-banking 
organizations) rather than total demand. Those excluded 
from this second market, the residual, have the option 
of seeking credit in the informal sector, which operates 
through both market and non-market transactions. In 
this dual-dual credit system, the poorest groups pay 
the highest price for credit. In sum, the three empirical 
regularities established at the beginning of this paper 
are all explained by the model.
There is now the dynamic equilibrium question. The 
study by Tressel (2003) is very helpful in this regard. It 
presents a dynamic macroeconomic model in a standard 
growth theory context to study the dynamics of the dual 
credit market over time. The basic assumptions of Tressel’s 
model are that banks operate with collateral (as in the 
model used here) and that the expansion of the banking 
industry over time depends upon the accumulation of 
assets by entrepreneurs, because those assets are needed 
as credit collateral; hence, in his model the level and 
distribution of wealth also play a significant role in the 
development of the banking industry. 
This conclusion is consistent with what would 
emerge from the extension of the static model presented 
here to a dynamic one. If the poor could accumulate 
capital in significant amounts, the dual-dual credit 
system would tend to disappear; hence, the persistence 
of this system in less developed countries can be taken 
to be the result of a process of economic growth in 
which wealth inequality either increases or does not 
decrease significantly. 
The public policy implications of the model 
can be stated in terms of the policies that have been 
most commonly applied, which have not been very 
effective in changing the dual-dual structure, given its 
persistence: 
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(i) government policies concentrate on the banking 
industry, but neglect the indirect effects on the formal 
non-banking market and the informal sector; 
(ii) the effect of State programmes of legal security for 
property rights has not been significant because they 
do not change the inequality of wealth in society; 
(iii) the effect of banking industry liberalization (absence 
of financial repression) has not been significant 
because the dual-dual structure operates even under 
conditions of perfect competition in the banking 
industry, as shown by the model developed in 
this paper; 
(iv) the current role of the State as regulator in the 
financial system has not had a significant effect 
because regulation does not impede the dual-dual 
credit system, as the model also shows. 
Changing the dual-dual system and the type of 
economic growth that comes with it would require a State 
that was more developmental and innovative. Innovative 
ways of redistributing concentrated wealth and new rules 
and new forms of organization in the financial system 
are the public policies that derive from the theoretical 
model presented in this paper.
(Original: English)
Bibliography
Backhouse, Roger (1981), “Credit rationing in a general equilibrium 
model”, Economica, New Series, vol. 48, No. 190, London, 
London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Banerjee, Abhijit (2003), “Contracting constraints, credit markets, 
and economic development”, Advances in Economics and 
Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Eight World Congress 
of the Econometric Society, Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Hansen 
and Stephen Turnovsky (eds.), vol. 3, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
Barro, Robert (1997), Macroeconomics, Cambridge, The mit Press.
Berger, Allen and others (2004), “Bank concentration and competition: 
an evolution in the making”, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, vol. 36, No. 6, Blackwell Publishing.
Berger, Allen and Gregory Udell (1995), “Relationship lending and 
lines of credit in small firm finance”, The Journal of Business, 
vol. 68, No. 3, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
 (1992), “Some evidence on the empirical significance of 
credit rationing”, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100, 
No. 5, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Besanko, David and Thakor Anjan (1987), “Collateral and rationing: 
sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit 
markets”, International Economic Review, vol. 28, No. 3, 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania/Osaka University 
Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Campion, Anita, Rashmi Kiran-Ekka and Mark Wenner (2010), 
“Interest rates and implications for microfinance in Latin 
America and the Caribbean”, Working Paper Series, No. 177, 
Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank.
Chan, Yuk-Shee and George Kanatas (1985), “Asymmetric valuations 
and the role of collateral in loan agreements”, Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 17, No. 1, Blackwell 
Publishing.
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh and Andrei Shleifer (2005), 
“Private credit in 129 countries”, nber Working Papers, 
No. 11078, Cambridge, Massachusetts, National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Fried, Joel and Peter Howitt (1980), “Credit rationing and implicit 
contract theory”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 
vol. 12, No. 3, Blackwell Publishing.
Inderst, Roman and Holger Mueller (2007), “A lender based theory 
of collateral”, Journal of Finance Economics, vol. 84, No. 3, 
Amsterdam, Elsevier.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and John Moore (1997), “Credit cycles”, Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 105, No. 2, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press.
Krugman, Paul and Robin Wells (2006), Macroeconomics, New 
York, Worth Publishers.
Manove, Michael, Jorge Padilla and Marco Pagano (2001), “Collateral 
versus project screening: a model of lazy banks”, rand 
Journal of Economics, vol. 32, No. 4, Santa Monica, The 
Rand Corporation.
Mishkin, Frederic (2007), The Economics of Money, Banking and 
Financial Markets, Boston, Pearson.
Morduch, Jonathan (1999), “The microfinance promise”, Journal 
of Economic Literature, vol. 37, No. 4, Nashville, Tennessee, 
American Economic Association.
Steijvers, Tensie and Wim Voordeckers (2009), “Collateral and credit 
rationing: a review of recent empirical studies as a guide for 
future research”, Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 23, No. 5, 
Wiley-Blackwell.
Stiglitz, Joseph (2002), “Information and the change in the paradigm 
in economics”, The American Economic Review, vol. 92, No. 3, 
Nashville, Tennessee, American Economic Association. 
Stiglitz, Joseph and Andrew Weiss (1981), “Credit rationing in 
markets with imperfect information”, American Economic 
Review, vol. 71, No. 3, Nashville, Tennessee, American 
Economic Association.
Tressel, Thierry (2003), “Dual financial systems and inequalities in 
economic development”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 8, 
No. 2, New York, Springer.
Villas-Boas, Miguel and Udo Schmidt-Mohr (1999), “Oligopoly with 
asymmetric information: differentiation in credit markets”, The 
rand Journal of Economics, vol. 30, No. 3, Santa Monica, 
The rand Corporation.
